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Divergent Discourses About
International Law, Indigenous
Peoples, and Rights over Lands
and Natural Resources: Toward a
Realist Trend
S. James Anaya
ABSTRACT
In this article renowned scholar S. James Anaya analyzes the divergent
assessments of international law's treatment of indigenous peoples'
demands to lands and natural resources. The author explores several
. Prof. S. James Anaya is the James J. Lenoir Professor of Human Rights Law and
Policy at the University of Arizona Rogers College of Law, where he teaches and
conducts research in the areas of international law and organizations, constitutional law,
and issues concerning indigenous peoples. Professor Anaya received his B.A. from the
University of New Mexico (1980) and his J.D. from Harvard (1983). Among his
numerous publications is his book, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford
University Press, 1996). Professor Anaya was on the law faculty at the University of
Iowa from 1988 to 1999, and he has been a visiting professor at Harvard Law School, the
University of Toronto, and the University of Tulsa. Prior to becoming a full time law
professor, he practiced law in Albuquerque, New Mexico, representing Native American
peoples and other minority groups in regard to land, voting rights, and civil rights issues.
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strains of arguments that have been advanced within this debate,
including state-centered arguments and human rights-based arguments.
The author also examines the shortcomings of recurring interpretive
approaches to international law that consider indigenous peoples' rights
to land and resources. From this analysis the author identifies a more
promising approach within the human rights framework-which he
describes as a realist approach-that focuses on the confluence of values,
power, and change. The author argues that the realist perspective offers a
more pragmatic and ethical approach within the discourse of indigenous
rights over lands and natural resources.
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a good bit of analysis and argument
about the rights of indigenous peoples in international law, as indigenous
peoples themselves have pressed their demands through channels of
international decision making. A central issue has been that of the
existence or extent of rights over lands and natural resources, which are
widely understood to be critical to the physical and cultural survival of
indigenous peoples as distinct groups. This understanding follows from
indigenous peoples' articulated ideas of communal stewardship over land
and a deeply felt spiritual and emotional nexus with the earth and its
fruits. Furthermore, indigenous peoples typically have looked to a secure
land and natural resource base to ensure the economic viability and
development of their communities.
Among the multiple participants in the discussions that measure
indigenous peoples' demands to lands and resources in terms of
international law, divergent propositions have emerged. For some,
historical legal doctrine firmly establishes indigenous peoples' sovereign
rights over ancestral lands and resources as a matter of long-standing
international law, while within this view these rights are seen as having
been observed almost entirely in their breech. For others, international
law historically or in its current state provides little or no protection for
such rights; under this view indigenous peoples' rights over lands and
resources are mostly aspirational, rights to be recognized-if at all-by
future instruments of international law. Still others focus on recent
developments to advance the view that a new generation of international
law already yields to indigenous peoples' demands for rights over lands
and resources, at least to the extent reconcilable with the basic elements
of state sovereignty. Variants of these divergent views abound, with the
latter one appearing to be the increasingly dominant one among
[Vol. 16:2
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international authorities and decision makers.'
The dominance of the view that indigenous peoples already possess
rights to lands and natural resources under international law is illustrated
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in the Case of the Mayanga
Community of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua.2 In that case both the Inter-
American Commission and the Inter-American Court found that
Nicaragua violated relevant international law when it failed to recognize
and secure the traditional land tenure of the indigenous Mayangna
community of Awas Tingni and instead proceeded to grant a concession
to a Korean multinational corporation for large-scale logging on the
community's traditional lands. The Inter-American Commission has
applied and expanded upon the precedent set down in the Awas Tingni
3case in subsequent cases.
In an effort to understand the divergent assessments about
international law's treatment of the rights of indigenous peoples over
lands and natural resources, this essay identifies different strains of
1. In previous works the author has joined in advancing the view that international
law has developed in recent years in a manner responsive to indigenous peoples'
demands, although with certain limitations. See, e.g., S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2004).
2. The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 79 (Judgment on merits and reparations of Aug. 31, 2001),
published in abridged version in 19 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 395 (2002) [hereinafter
Awas Tingni case]. Before it submitted the case to the Inter-American Court, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, in accordance with the established procedure,
adopted its report in the case, which is summarized in the Inter-American Court's
judgment. See id. 25, 26. See also Complaint of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, Submitted to the Inter-American Court of Human Right in the Case of the
Awas Tingni Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community Against the Republic of
Nicaragua, June 1998, reprinted in 19 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 17 (2002); Final
Written Arguments of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights before the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous
Community of Awas Tingni Against the Republic of Nicaragua (Unofficial Translation),
Aug. 10, 2001, reprinted in 19 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. LAW 325 (2002) [hereinafter Final
Written Arguments of the Inter-American Commission in the Awas Tingni case]. The
author was lead counsel to the community of Awas Tingni throughout the proceedings
leading to the judgment by the Inter-American Court, and he assisted the Inter-American
Commission in presenting the case to the Inter-American Court.
3. See Mary and Carrie Dann, United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Report
No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L/VII. 117, doc. 1 rev. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Dann case], available
at http://cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/USA. 11140.htm; Maya Indigenous Communities of
the Toledo District, Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Report 40/04 (2004)
[hereinafter Maya case], available at http://cidh.org/annualrep/2004eng/
Belize. 12053eng.htm. The author also participated in these cases as lead or co-counsel on
behalf of the indigenous parties.
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argument and interpretive approaches within the discourse of indigenous
rights.4 This exercise is not intended to simply cast a fog of
indeterminacy. Rather it is an effort to contextualize, explain, and
provide some justification for the dominant trend of argument and
analysis that is illustrated by the Awas Tingni case and its progeny, with
the hope of encouraging that trend. The interpretive method that resulted
in the outcome in Awas Tingni arises within a human rights frame of
analysis, rather than one that sees indigenous peoples' rights as based
fundamentally on a continuity of historical sovereignty. And that
interpretive method contrasts with formalist approaches that tend to read
legal texts narrowly and as static instruments, as well as with critical
approaches that deconstruct texts and established doctrine to reject them
but without providing much in their place. In this regard, the decision in
Awas Tingni can be described as realist in that it was based on a broad,
contextual reading of a human rights treaty and the values implicit in the
treaty, in light of evolving thinking and patterns of official behavior. If
international law is working in favor of indigenous peoples, it is pursuant
to such a realist approach within a human rights frame of analysis.
II. LOCATING THE FOUNDATIONS OF INDIGENOUS
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE DIVERGENCE
AND INTERPLAY OF HISTORICAL SOVEREIGNTY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSES
The appeal to international law is to its presumptive capacity to
exert control over or influence the exercise of power, most significantly
the power wielded directly by independent states. Indigenous peoples
and their advocates have advanced arguments based on what
international law is perceived to provide or what it should provide to
condition the behavior of states in their relations with indigenous
peoples. International law is looked upon as a way of compelling, or at
least encouraging, states to act consistently with a catalogue of rights
deemed fundamental to the survival of indigenous peoples, including
rights over lands and natural resources. Among those who advocate for
indigenous rights within the discourse of international law, two, usually
complementary, strains of argument emerge.
4. The descriptions of the arguments and interpretive strains in this essay are
substantially based on the author's own direct observations of discussions about
indigenous peoples' rights among advocates for indigenous peoples, government
representatives, scholars, and representatives of international agencies in various forums
over a period of some twenty years.
[Vol. 16:2
Toward a Realist Trend
One strain of argument occurs essentially within a state-centered
frame. Indigenous groups are referred to as "nations" and identified as
having attributes of sovereignty that predate and, at least to some extent,
trump the sovereignty of the states that now assert power over them. The
rhetoric of nationhood is used to posit indigenous peoples as states, or
something like states, within a perceived post-Westphalian world of
separate, mutually exclusive political communities. Within this frame of
argument, advocates for indigenous peoples point to a history in which
the "original" sovereignty of indigenous communities over defined
territories has been illegitimately wrested from them or suppressed. The
rules of international law relating to the acquisition and transfer of
territory by and among states are invoked to demonstrate the illegitimacy
of the assault on indigenous sovereignty and derivative rights over lands
and natural resources. Under this argument, claims to land, group
equality, culture, and development assistance stem from the claim for
reparations for the historical injustices against entities that, a priori,
should be regarded as independent political communities with full status
as such on the international plane.
A second strain of argument employed by advocates for indigenous
peoples focuses on the problem within a human rights frame. This strain
of argument seizes upon the moral and ethical discourse that
characterizes the modem human rights movement, that has the welfare of
human beings as its subject, and that is concerned only secondarily, if at
all, with the interests of sovereign entities. Indigenous peoples are
portrayed as groups of human beings with fundamental human rights
concerns that deserve attention. Historical narrative enters into this strain
of argument to identify past acts of oppression against indigenous
peoples, but the backward-looking narrative is mainly used to identify
the origins and historical continuity of present day oppression and
inequities that affect today's indigenous human beings and their
communities. Affirmation of indigenous group rights, and related
remedial measures to secure the enjoyment of these rights, are posited as
moral imperatives and justified by reference to human rights principles
that are already part, or becoming part, of international law.
The United Nations (UN) and other international intergovernmental
organizations, which together provide the institutional framework for the
contemporary international system, have been more hospitable to the
latter, human rights strain of argument. By contrast, the state-centered
historical sovereignty strain of argument finds substantial resistance
within intergovernmental organizations. Because of legal, institutional,
and political factors, the major international organizations necessarily
favor the spheres of sovereignty asserted by their member states over any
claim of competing sovereignty by a nonmember entity. Claims that are
2005]
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grounded in the language of human rights, on the other hand, find greater
opportunities for success by virtue of the institutional energies that the
United Nations and other international organizations increasingly have
devoted to human rights matters and moral considerations over the last
several decades.
While the human rights strain of argument advanced by indigenous
peoples has been more effective, the state-centered strain has not been
without consequence. Accounts of the illegitimate wresting of historical
sovereignty have strengthened the human rights arguments by enhancing
sensitivity toward the inequities suffered by indigenous peoples that can
be understood in human rights terms. Such accounts have helped forge
an understanding that indigenous peoples have suffered, not just discrete
episodic acts of neglect or even brutality by state actors, but also more
systemic oppression as a result of state institutional arrangements that
have been imposed on them and have failed to accommodate their
cultural patterns.
Thus, with their arguments resonating within the discourse of
human rights, indigenous peoples have gained a foothold in the
international system's human rights program,5 while so far finding little
or no effective opening within the international system for efforts to
explicitly ground their rights on attributes of historical sovereignty or
statehood. The draft of a UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples was produced by an expert panel acting under the authority of
the UN Commission on Human Rights, and ongoing discussions are
taking place within that human rights body.6 Similar discussions
surrounding a proposal for an American Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples have led to the initial draft of this American
Declaration, developed by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, and discussions are ongoing within a working group of the
Permanent Council of the Organization of American States. 7 Well-
established human rights principles provide the foundations for the
standards of indigenous rights articulated in both these discussions, while
principles of state sovereignty enter the discussions only in attempts to
limit the standards in favor of states themselves.
Outside these discussions on future normative texts, the Inter-
American Commission as well as the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights have examined several cases involving indigenous peoples as
8matters of human rights, as illustrated in the Awas Tingni case. For their
5. See PATRICK THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2002).
6. ANAYA, supra note 1, at 63.
7. Id. at 66.
8. Id. at 260-71.
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part, the UN human rights treaty-monitoring bodies, including the
Human Rights Committee and the Committee on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, now regularly examine the concerns of
indigenous peoples as part of their work to monitor compliance with the
human rights treaties to which they are attached.9 What we see is that,
whereas the institutional chambers of the international system have all
but kept their doors closed to indigenous claims of historical sovereignty,
several have been welcoming of indigenous demands based on human
rights arguments.
III. DIVERGENT INTERPRETIVE METHODOLOGIES
THAT FRAME DIVERGENT DISCOURSES ABOUT THE
CONTENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
International legal discourse about the rights of indigenous peoples,
whether within the historical sovereignty framework or the human rights
one, involves efforts to assess the current state of international law as it
concerns indigenous peoples. These assessments are used alternatively to
support indigenous claims, to deny them, to establish the need to change
the law, or to resist proposals for change. Efforts to assess the status of
international law typically focus on one or more of the standard sources
of international law, which include treaties, custom, general principles of
law and, secondarily, judicial decisions and the writings of qualified
publicists that interpret the primary sources. 10 Methods of understanding
the nature of these sources and interpreting them vary significantly, and
that variance can be seen in discussions and decision making about
indigenous peoples and their rights. The variance in interpretive
methodology is further complicated by the relatively fast pace of
international developments that are responsive to indigenous peoples'
demands and that can be understood to contribute to the evolution of
relevant international law by adding to one or more of the standard
sources. 11
9. Id. at 228-32, 253-58.
10. Cf. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59
Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945) (referring to these as the
sources of authority to be applied by the International Court of Justice in deciding cases
in accordance with international law).
11. See generally THORNBERRY, supra note 5 (describing and analyzing
developments with the United Nations and regional human rights institutions); Siegfried
Wiessner, The Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and
International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HuM. RTs. J. 57 (1999) (surveying international
and domestic legal developments).
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A. The Ghosts of Formalism
A recurrent method of interpreting the sources of international law
can be described as falling within the tradition of formalism. As used
here formalism refers to an approach that focuses on the wording of legal
texts and on established doctrinal threads, while infusing the texts with
meaning on the basis of conventional understandings that are attributed
to the states that created them or to abstract first principles.' 2 For
formalists, words in texts, settled doctrine, and first principles tend to
have preordained, fixed meaning that is discerned often in isolation from
the political and social dynamics and the changing value structures to
which they are relevant. The fonnalist method itself leads to varying
results, depending in part upon the extent to which states are deemed to
have discretion in shaping or changing the governing rules.
1. Formalism, Positivism, and Apology
Formalism in its dominant variant is closely associated with the
positivist school of international law at its height, around the beginning
of the last century, which emphasized state sovereignty and articulated
the rules created by states to dispossess indigenous peoples of their lands.
A hallmark of formalism in international legal discourse is the search for
and identification of a definitive assessment of "what international law
says," while treating international law as a body of rules with fixed
determinate meaning that derives from observable action by states at
some time in the past. Formalists do not necessarily agree with rules
established in the past, but for them the rules remain the same until
changed by new, positive acts by the states that created or endowed them
with legal authority. This approach often provides little room for
discerning the normative implications of established principles and
ongoing processes beyond what states-or sometimes others considered
to have sufficient authority-have already put down in written text.
The ghosts of positivistic formalism are clearly present in current
discussions over indigenous peoples and their rights. Arguments of
indigenous historical sovereignty are countered by the absence of
contemporary recognition of that sovereignty among the positive acts of
states in their international relations and, at least implicitly, by reference
to late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century international legal
doctrine that upheld the expansion and consolidation of the sovereignty
12. Cf Roy L. BROOKS, STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING FROM LEGAL
FORMALISM TO CRITICAL THEORY 37-59 (2002) (discussing legal formalism in American
jurisprudence).
[Vol. 16:2
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of European states and their offspring over traditional indigenous lands.
13
Formal categories of statehood and related doctrine, which a priori
excluded non-European, "uncivilized" indigenous peoples from among
the subjects of international law with rights of sovereignty, provide the
foundations for arguments that, whatever rights of historical sovereignty
indigenous peoples may have once possessed, those rights have long
ceased to be recognized by international law and instead have been made
subject to the overriding sovereignty of states by international law itself.
State representatives also frequently resort to formalist approaches
within the human rights framework of indigenous rights discourse,
focusing on existing human rights texts that do not specifically mention
indigenous peoples in association with prior conventional
understandings. They consequently interpret those texts as providing
little or no protection for indigenous peoples' collective rights. Take, for
example, the right to property as affirmed in general terms in the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights 14 and other human rights
instruments, including the American Convention on Human Rights. 15 As
discussed below, it is possible to interpret the right to property as
supportive of indigenous peoples' land rights if one avoids formalism in
favor of another approach. Employing a formalist approach, however,
states typically have deemed the right to property in existing instruments
to have little or nothing to do with traditional or ancestral indigenous
collective land tenure, since that right is articulated in individualistic
terms and understood to be associated with accepted Western notions of
property.
Somewhat ironically, some indigenous representatives and their
advocates have frequently invoked the same formalist approach to come
to similar conclusions and, moreover, to characterize international law as
devoid of adequate standards for indigenous peoples. At least in part, this
can be seen as a strategic move to bolster the case for new international
instruments, in particular, a new United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Without such a new instrument, it is often
said with lament, indigenous peoples will continue without rights or with
insufficient rights in international law.
13. See, e.g., JOHN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 110, 136-45 (1894); WILLIAM E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 47-49,
65 (Alexander P. Higgins ed., 8th ed. 1924); CHARLES C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
CHIEFLY As APPLIED AND INTERPRETED BY THE UNITED STATES 19, 125-26, 163-71
(1922).
14. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., art. 17, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
15. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 21, 9 I.L.M. 673,
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Notably, some indigenous advocates from North America have
relied on formalist arguments to criticize the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries (Convention No. 169),16 the major
existing international treaty devoted to indigenous issues. The
Convention is acknowledged to represent "what international law says,"
but only in relation to states that have ratified it; it is read narrowly
without much regard to the core principles it advances, the interplay
between the Convention and transformative events in several countries
outside of North America, or its impact on international decision making
concerning indigenous peoples more broadly. 17 To be sure, the text of
Convention No. 169 includes several qualifiers that can be seen as
leaving substantial state discretion in tact, and it undoubtedly falls short
of indigenous peoples' full aspirations. But by employing formalism to
interpret the Convention, indigenous advocates give up highly useful
arguments that otherwise could be derived from the Convention's central
affirmation of indigenous cultural and group integrity and from many of
its specific provisions that build upon that affirmation. Instead of relying
on formalist arguments, many indigenous peoples have pragmatically
invoked Convention No. 169's land rights provisions. These provisions
center on the mandate that "governments shall respect the special
importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned
of their relationship with the lands or territories... which they occupy or
otherwise use,"' 8 and include the requirement that "[t]he rights of the
peoples concerned over the lands they traditionally occupy shall be
recognized."' 9
2. Formalism with an Anti-Positivist Twist Toward Utopia
As pointed out above, formalism is invoked to oppose the historical
sovereignty argument that favors indigenous peoples' rights. Notably, the
indigenous historical sovereignty argument itself rests on a formalist
methodology, although within an anti-positivist variant. An exemplary
16. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries, June 27, 1989, International Labour Conference, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (entered into
force Sept. 5, 1991) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 169].
17. See Luis Rodriguez-Pifiero, (unpublished Ph.D. thesis on ILO Convention No.
169); DONNA LEE VAN COTT, THE FRIENDLY LIQUIDATION OF THE PAST: THE POLITCS OF
DIVERSITY IN LATIN AMERICA (2000) (discussing the relation between ILO Convention
No. 169 and domestic legal and policy reforms in Latin America); ANAYA, supra note 1,
at 209 n.58 (identifying domestic judicial decisions applying ILO Convention No. 169),
18. ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 16, art. 13,1(1), 28 I.L.M. at 1387.
19. Id. art. 14.1(1), 28 I.L.M. at 1387.
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account of the historical sovereignty argument is made in a
groundbreaking article by John Clinebell and Jim Thompson, first
published in 1978, when indigenous peoples and their concerns had yet
20to gain prominence at the United Nations or other international venues.
This argument represents the kind of legal reasoning that helped motivate
the indigenous rights movement, especially in its early stages, to posit
indigenous claims as a matter of international law. Clinebell and
Thompson focus particularly on Indian tribes in North America, many of
which entered into treaties with European powers or their progeny before
the latter part of the nineteenth century. Formal international law
doctrine frames the argument that the tribes, or at least many of them,
have the necessary attributes of statehood and hence are entitled to
exercise sovereignty, and that the tribes have not been validly or entirely
dispossessed of that sovereignty. This argument is made thoroughly and
methodically, and entirely within the logic of long established and still
current doctrine of international law relating to the existence, rights, and
duties of states.
But while grounding their argument in the classical legal doctrine
that presumptively originates in state practice and authority, Clinebell
and Thompson do not see indigenous rights of historical sovereignty to
be diminished by the demonstrable contrary pattern of historical state
practice and exercise of authority that denied sovereign rights to
indigenous peoples. 21 Instead, in anti-positivist fashion, formal legal
doctrine is seen as an autonomous force that constrains, rather than
merely follows, the disparate and concerted actions of states. Typical of
the historical sovereignty argument, Clinebell and Thompson reinforce
their position by a formalistic assessment of contemporary international
legal texts that accord "all peoples" a right of "self-determination., 22 The
thesis advanced by Clinebell and Thompson has not been adopted by any
international tribunal or other body that is part of the international system
of intergovernmental institutions. Nonetheless, the arguments in favor of
the thesis are compelling, given their logic and the underlying equities,
20. See John Howard Clinebell & Jim Thompson, Sovereignty and Self-
Determination: The Rights of Native Americans Under International Law, 27 BuFFALO L.
REv. 669 (1978).
21. This contrary pattern of state practice and exercise of authority is summarized in
Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law:
Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L. J. 660,
672-76 (1990).
22. Clinebell and Thompson make this argument by referencing the particular
wording of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
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and these arguments helped to force open the contemporary international
discussion about the rights and status of indigenous peoples.
Formalism is also employed by some indigenous advocates in the
discussions around proposals for "new" international standards
concerning indigenous peoples within the human rights framework.
Formalist arguments take shape to advance the adoption without any
changes of the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, 2 3 which was developed by a working group of the
UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
with significant indigenous participation and which is now under
consideration by the Sub-Commission's parent body, the UN
Commission on Human Rights. Within the ongoing negotiations of the
draft, arguments made to criticize and resist proposals for alternative
language for the Declaration similarly employ formalism. Words in the
Sub-Commission draft or alternative proposed text are infused with
meaning based on fixed, predetermined conceptions, with the implicit
assertion that the words, if adopted, will have a force substantially apart
from the social and political forces and value structures within which
they will be deployed. This formalism can be seen in the arguments
made by many indigenous advocates to reject proposed alternative
language to the draft concerning rights over lands and natural resources.
The relevant language of the Sub-Commission draft, which broadly and
in detailed fashion affirms rights over lands and resources, is vigorously
defended, while proposals for change in that language are read in
isolation and in the worst possible light, with the apparent assumption
that the worse-case reading would carry the day in the application of the
Declaration.
Such approaches, when based on tightly reasoned arguments, can
have strategic utility toward achieving the strongest possible text from
the standpoint of indigenous peoples. And very often serious substantive
differences are involved in these discussions. But the utopian faith in the
force of particular wording and fear of calamity if that wording is not
maintained is often misplaced. The implicit assumption that the words in
international legal texts, or quasi-legal texts like a UN declaration, will
have a force substantially apart from their overall context or normative
thrust, or from evolving values and understandings, is highly dubious,
especially where human rights are concerned. Such an assumption runs
contrary to the very experience of applying existing human rights texts to
indigenous peoples, as discussed below. Not only does formalism make
23. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, E.S.C.
Res. 1994/45, U.N. ESCOR, 46th Sess., at 105, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (1994),
reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 541.
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for missed opportunities in the inflexibility it often yields, but it also
overestimates the impact that will actually result from the words and
abstract rules of a human rights text alone.
3. The Contradictory Use of "Secondary" Sources
The formalist search for "what international law says" typically
goes beyond an independent assessment of written instruments adopted
by states or their other relevant practice and relies on "secondary"
sources of international law such as the decisions of courts, international
institutions, and scholarly publications that interpret texts and state
practice. Looking to such secondary sources is, of course, standard fare
in international legal discourse of all variants. But in the search for a
definitive picture of the law the formalist often treats secondary sources
as themselves defining the state of the law. This formalist view of
secondary sources arises in arguments trying to show where the law falls
short of indigenous peoples' aspirations or where current international
law already upholds indigenous peoples' rights. This approach can be
internally inconsistent, however, in that the institutions and writers that
provide the secondary sources do not, by definition, have formal law-
making authority, and they are very often engaged in interpretation of a
different type.
The decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the
Awas Tingni case, which upheld indigenous peoples' rights to lands and
natural resources, is now often cited within formalist renditions of
international law, both to assert that the decision has limited reach as
well as to try to put the best face on "what international law says." The
Inter-American Court's decision in the Awas Tingni case, however,
departs significantly from the formalist method in interpreting and
applying the relevant law.24 If the Court had succumbed to the ghosts of
formalism it would not have decided as it did. Yet we see the Awas
Tingni decision being readily included in formalist renditions of "what
international law says" on the rights of indigenous peoples.
Interpretive contradiction of this kind would not defeat ascribing
near definitive significance to decisions of institutions like the Inter-
American Court if such institutions had the ability to make rather than
interpret and apply the law beyond the cases they decide. But such is not
the case within the very logic of formalism. In the world of legal
formalism, with its positivist foundation, only states make international
law. Thus the formal rules of international law provide that a state,
absent its consent, is not bound to what international courts or
24. See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
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institutions have decided in the abstract or in relation to a case to which
the state is not a party, hence the status of these decisions as "secondary"
sources. As a formal matter, international institutions and courts have no
direct law-making authority, only the authority to interpret and in some
cases apply the law in regard to specific parties; certainly publicists,
however eminent or qualified, have no such authority. For the formalist,
the decisions or opinions of secondary sources can be relevant only
because they interpret the law made by states in ways that are more or
less persuasive, not because they make the law; hence the
authoritativeness of those decisions must be diminished for the formalist
when the interpretive method employed to reach them is at odds with the
formalist method, as in the Awas Tingni case. Moreover, the impulse to
ascribe norm-building significance to the decisions of courts,
international institutions, and qualified publicists is problematic on its
own terms within the formalist logic which denies law-making authority
to all but states. That impulse fits much better within the realist
interpretive discourse, as discussed below.
B. Critical Approaches: Deconstruction, and Then What?
As pointed out above, formalism has been used to criticize existing
aspects of international law regarding indigenous peoples and proposals
for "new" standards of indigenous rights, in particular proposals that
deviate from the Sub-Commission's Draft United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Other approaches arrive at similar
criticisms, but through different routes of analysis. One influential type
of criticism looks beyond conventional understandings associated with
particular doctrine or the wording of legal texts to examine their
conceptual underpinnings and thereby reveal problems. Critical
approaches of this type are associated with the critical legal studies
movement and postmodern thought, and they have made their way into
an important stream of scholarship about international law.25
These postmodern critical approaches are useful in that they
engender broad awareness of the pitfalls and structural baggage that
frequently come with existing or proposed legal texts and doctrine. They
lead to inquiry about political context, power structures, and paradigms
of thinking that determine how law actually works or has worked in the
past to disadvantage particular groups. Using such an approach, one can
uncover the shortcomings of international law in relation to indigenous
25. See Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32 HARV.
INT'L L. J. 81 (1991); Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order, and Critical
Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REv. 811 (1990) (book review).
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peoples, not just in formal terms but in terms of international law's
presuppositions and the forces that have oppressed indigenous peoples.
Important scholarly works that critically examine historical international
legal doctrine reveal how it functioned to justify the nonconsensual
taking of indigenous lands and the deep cultural biases undergirding and
structuring that doctrine.26 These works bring into question the
legitimacy of contemporary political configurations and property regimes
that rest on historical legal doctrine, and hence sound a compelling call
for reform.
But a common shortcoming of postmodern critical approaches is
that they often end at the call for reform and fail to offer specific
solutions to the problems they uncover. International legal texts and
doctrine are deconstructed to show their failings, and the critical analysis
stops there. As already pointed out, analysis of this type can be useful as
far as it goes. But it can be counterproductive when deployed in
discussions about the content of contemporary international law or about
proposed changes to the law, when the focus on deconstruction leads, as
it often does, to accentuating the negative at the expense of identifying
shifts in power, social conditions, or value structures that operate to
counter the negative.
27
In the discussions around the Draft United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, some advocates have employed
approaches along the lines of postmodern criticism to paint a bleak
picture of contemporary international law as it relates to indigenous
peoples and to oppose some of the proposals advanced by states and
others. This approach could be seen in the discussions over rights to
lands and natural resources, especially before the Awas Tingni decision
was rendered. Provisions of existing human rights treaties generally
affirming rights to property and the indigenous land rights provisions of
ILO Convention No. 169 have been deconstructed by reference to the
"Western cultural biases" underlying them and the dire forces of state
hegemony and international politics. Proposals for land rights provisions
that are alternatives to those in the Sub-Commission Draft Declaration
have been similarly deconstructed to uncover undesirable paradigmatic
26. See, e.g., ROBERT WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990); PAUL KEAL, EUROPEAN CONQUEST AND
THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: THE MORAL BACKWARDNESS OF INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY (2003).
27. Robert Williams, Jr., is among the exceptions to those who have employed a
postmodern critical approach to deconstruct historical aspects of international law and
then seized upon contemporary trends to attempt to build an understanding of
international legal process that favors indigenous peoples' rights. See generally Williams,
supra note 21.
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presuppositions about control over territory favoring non-indigenous
majorities. At the same time, the deconstructionist critiques accord little
attention to contemporary trends in thinking that are serving to dilute
those presuppositions and that would likely influence the way in which
the proposed language would actually be interpreted and applied.
Curiously, in the discussions on the Draft Declaration, postmodern
deconstruction of rejected text is often followed by a formalistic defense
of the language of the Sub-Commission Draft Declaration or of other
preferred language. It would be highly illuminating and interesting to see
the same techniques of postmodern criticism applied in a scrutiny of the
Sub-Commission draft. Indeed, adherence to postmodem critical
approaches of the kind that have been seen in the discussions on the
Draft Declaration might well lead to simply declaring the whole exercise
futile.
C. International Law Understood in Realistic, Dynamic, and
Sometimes Even Hopeful Terms
While the ghosts of formalism persist and critical method continues
to show the darkness within any silver lining that may exist, international
law as it concerns indigenous peoples is increasingly understood in terms
that avoid formalism's inattention to reality and the lack of problem
solving in much of postmodern critical analysis. In stark contrast with
those approaches, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights in the
Awas Tingni case accepted that the right to property, as affirmed in the
American Convention on Human Rights in its Article 21, includes the
collective right of indigenous peoples to their lands and resources on the
basis of traditional tenure and indigenous customary law. Article 21 of
the American Convention states: "Everyone has the right to the use and
enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and
enjoyment to the interest of society. 28
Although the Inter-American Court stressed that Nicaragua's
domestic law itself affirms indigenous communal property, the Court
emphasized that the rights articulated in international human rights
instruments have "autonomous meaning, for which reason they cannot be
made equivalent to the meaning given to them in domestic law.",29 The
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights had pressed this point in
prosecuting the case before the Inter-American Court, invoking in its
28. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 15, art. 21, 1, 9 I.L.M. at
681.
29. Awas Tingni case, supra note 2, 146.
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written submissions the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights regarding the analogous property rights provision of the European
Convention on Human Rights and referencing developments elsewhere
in international law and institutions specifically concerning indigenous
peoples' rights over lands and natural resources.30 The Inter-American
Court accepted the Inter-American Commission's view that, in its
meaning autonomous from domestic law, the international human right
of property embraces the communal property regimes of indigenous
peoples as defined by their own customs and traditions, such that
"possession of the land should suffice for indigenous communities
lacking real title to property of the land to obtain official recognition of
that property.'
In holding that Nicaragua violated that right when it granted logging
concessions on indigenous lands, the Inter-American Court was not
deterred by the absence of any specific reference in the American
Convention on Human Rights to indigenous peoples or collective rights,
by the individualistic terms in which the right to property is expressed in
the American Convention, or by the language that allows the state to
"subordinate" that right to the "interests of society." Rather than merely
looking at the formal wording of the American Convention's property
provision or asking what obligations states intend to assume under that
particular provision, the Inter-American Court looked to the core values
represented by the American Convention's property provision in
association with international trends in acceptable action and thinking
about indigenous peoples' rights. In so doing, the Inter-American Court
employed what it termed an "evolutionary" method of interpretation,
taking into account modern developments in conceptions about property
as related to indigenous peoples and their lands.32 In his concurring
opinion, Judge Garcia Ramirez expounded upon this interpretive
methodology, making specific references both to the relevant provisions
of ILO Convention No. 169, even though Nicaragua is not a party to that
Convention, as well as to parts of the draft UN and Organization of
American States declarations on the rights of indigenous peoples.33 Judge
Cangado Trindade, the president of the Inter-American Court, joined
judges Pacheco G6mez and Abreu Burelli in another concurring opinion,
reiterating the cultural and spiritual underpinnings of indigenous peoples'
30. See Final Written Arguments of the Inter-American Commission in the Awas
Tingni case, supra note 2, 62-66.
31. Awas Tingni case, supra note 2, 151.
32. Id. 146-49.
33. Id. 7-9 (Ramirez, J., concurring).
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relations to lands.34
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights followed the
precedent and interpretive methodology of the Awas Tingni case in
finding that the United States violated the rights of Western Shoshone
sisters Mary and Carrie Dann in connection with Western Shoshone
claims over traditional lands.35 In that case-the Dann case-the Inter-
American Commission extended the interpretation of the right to
property of the American Convention on Human Rights advanced in the
Awas Tingni case to the similar property rights provision of the
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, emphasizing the
due process and equal protections prescriptions that are to attach to
indigenous property interests in lands and natural resources.36 The
Commission found that, by virtue of the means by which the United
States had disposed of Western Shoshone land claims, it had "failed to
ensure the Danns' right to property under conditions of equality contrary
to Articles II [right to equal protection], XVIII [right to fair trial] and
XXIII [right to property] of the American Declaration in connection with
their claims to property rights in the Western Shoshone ancestral
lands. 37 In applying and interpreting the cited provisions of the
American Declaration in the Dann case, the Inter-American Commission
was explicit in its reliance on developments and trends in the
international legal system regarding the rights of indigenous peoples.38
Significantly, the Inter-American Commission declared that the "basic
principles reflected in many of the provisions" of the Proposed American
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,3 9 which is currently
under discussion within the Organization of American States (OAS),
"including aspects of [its] article XVIII, reflect general international
legal principles developing out of and applicable inside and outside of
34. Id. (Trindade, J., G6mez, J., and Burelli, J.).
35. Dann case, supra note 3, 124-32.
36. Id. 133-34. "Every person has a right to own such private property as meets
the essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and
of the home." American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX,
Ninth International Conference of American States, art. XXIII (1948), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basic2.htm.
37. Dann case, supra note 3, 172; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man, supra note 36, arts. II, XVIII, XXIII.
38. Dann case, supra note 3, TT 124-28. The Commission noted that "a review of
pertinent treaties, legislation and jurisprudence reveals the development over more than
80 years of particular human rights norms and principles applicable to the circumstances
and treatment of indigenous peoples." Id. 7 125.
39. Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., 1333d Sess., OEA/Ser.LN/I1.95, doc. 7 (1997), available at
http://www.cidh.org/Indigenas/Indigenas.en.0l/Preamble.htm.
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the inter-American system and to this extent are properly considered in
interpreting and applying the provisions of the American Declaration in
the context of indigenous peoples., 40 The cited Article XVIII of the
Proposed American Declaration 4 1 provides for the protection of
traditional forms of land tenure in terms similar to those found in ILO
Convention 169, which the Inter-American Commission also highlighted
in its analysis.42
The Inter-American Commission employed the same interpretive
approach to further build upon the Awas Tingni precedent in a decision
involving the Maya communities of southern Belize.43 In that case the
Commission found that Belize violated the human rights of the Maya
communities by allowing large-scale logging to take place on their
traditional lands and by not taking effective measures to recognize and
secure rights in those lands. In contrast to the situations in Nicaragua and
the United States, the domestic legal system of Belize provided no
formal recognition of property interests of indigenous peoples on the
basis of traditional or customary patterns of land use and occupancy.
Nonetheless, reiterating and expanding upon the principles articulated by
the Inter-American Court in Awas Tingni, and again recounting
international developments concerning indigenous land rights, the Inter-
American Commission affirmed that indigenous peoples' traditional use
and occupancy of lands, such as that of the Maya communities of Belize,
are themselves a source of property that is protected independently by
inter-American human rights instruments, regardless of what domestic
law provides.44 In advancing this interpretation of the property rights
provision of the inter-American instruments, the Commission repeated
the view that the provisions contained in international human rights
instruments have meaning "autonomous" from the reach of domestic
law.45 And for the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American
Court, that meaning goes beyond a narrow reading of the words in those
40. Dann case, supra note 3, 129.
41. Article XVIII of the Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples establishes, inter alia, that "[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to the
legal recognition of their varied and specific forms and modalities of their control,
ownership, use and enjoyment of territories and property" and are entitled to "recognition
of their property and ownership rights with respect to lands, territories and resources they
have historically occupied, as well as to the use of those to which they have historically
had access for their traditional activities and livelihood." Proposed American Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous People, supra note 39, art. XVIII, 1-2.
42. See Dann case, supra note 3, 127-28.
43. See Maya case, supra note 3.
44. See id. 127-31.
45. Id. 131.
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instruments.
The approach exemplified by the Inter-American Court and the
Inter-American Commission in the Awas Tingni case and subsequent
cases can be described as realist in its focus on the principles and values
behind the formal wording of text, on how relevant actors understand
those principles and values to be acted upon, and on possible or actual
changes in those understandings. The realist tradition of legal
interpretation has a substantial pedigree in the jurisprudence of
international law,46 and it has made substantial inroads into international
human rights decision making, as these cases illustrate. With its focus on
the confluence of values, power (including the power of both
governmental and nongovernmental actors), and change, the realist
approach does not necessarily or always yield the preferred or optimal
results. But as the Awas Tingni, Dann, and Maya cases demonstrate, it is
an approach capable of taking advantage of favorable trends in action
that already have taken hold to arrive at an understanding of already
existing international law that, in some respects at least, approximates
what is being demanded by indigenous peoples.
The realist interpretive approach is now normally seen in
international human rights decision making both within and beyond the
inter-American institutions, including decision making in regard to
indigenous peoples. The interpretive statements of United Nations treaty-
monitoring bodies, which are charged with monitoring the human rights
treaties to which they are attached, are instructive. For example, the UN
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination (CERD) has interpreted
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination47 as requiring state parties to recognize and protect
indigenous peoples' cultures, rights of participation in all decisions
48affecting them, and collective rights to land and resources. CERD
arrived at and has applied this interpretation despite wording in that
46. For example, the following works by influential scholars can be seen as linked
to or building upon realist approaches: RICHARD FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1970); ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT (1994); MYRES S. McDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL
REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF
THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1981); Luis B. Sohn, Unratified Treaties as a Source of
Customary International Law, in REALISM IN LAW-MAKING: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN HONOR OF WILLEM RPHAGAN 231 (Adriaan Bos & Hugo Siblesz eds., 1986).
47. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352.
48. Indigenous Peoples, General Recommendation No. 23, U.N. Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 51st Sess., Annex V, 4-5, U.N. Doc. A/52/18
(1997), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/comments.htm.
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Convention that runs counter to differential treatment and that had
previously led many to regard the Convention, from essentially a
formalist point of view, as hostile to indigenous collective rights.
Additionally, the UN Human Rights Committee's interpretations of the
minority rights (art. 27) and self-determination (art. 1) provisions of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can be understood to
favor-at least to some extent-indigenous peoples' demands.49
The realist approach identified here has generated certain, now well-
accepted interpretive maxims that are often explicitly invoked in
international human rights decision making. These include the following:
terms in international human rights instruments are to be interpreted (1)
keeping in mind the overall context and object of the instrument of which
they form a part; (2) in light of the larger body of relevant existing or
developing human rights standards; and (3) in the manner that is most
advantageous to the enjoyment of human rights (the pro homine
principle). The human rights bodies mentioned above, and many others
in the international arena, can be seen applying these maxims along with
consideration of developing trends in thinking and action about human
rights, including the rights of indigenous peoples over lands and natural
resources.
IV. CONCLUSION
Within its human rights frame, international law is hospitable to
indigenous peoples' claims of rights over lands and natural resources, at
least to a point. It is within a human rights discourse, as opposed to an
historical sovereignty one, that the moral imperatives behind those
claims are most brought to the forefront of inquiry and consideration.
And it is the expression of those moral imperatives, rather than the
formalistic renditions of historical attributes of indigenous nationhood or
statehood, that are best able to confront entrenched configurations of
power and resonate for change. Furthermore, a realist interpretation of
49. See The Rights of Minorities (Art. 27), General Comment No. 23, U.N. Human
Rights Committee, 50th Sess., 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.5 (1994), available
at http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/comments.htm (commenting on the right of
minorities to enjoy their culture affirmed in article 27 and noting that "culture manifests
itself in many forms, including a particular way of life associated with the use of land
resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples"). In evaluating periodic
compliance reports by states, the Committee has identified indigenous peoples' rights to
lands and natural resources as rights falling within the purview of the right of self-
determination protected by article 1 of the Covenant. See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 112-
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the content of international human rights law takes advantage of the
evolution in values and shifts in power generated by indigenous peoples'
claims, such that, in some measure, the rights demanded by indigenous
peoples to lands and natural resources can be seen not simply as
aspirational, but as rights that already form part of international law
within a value structure that is presumptively shared by all. Formalist and
backward-looking postmodern critical approaches largely overlook such
an evolution in values and power relationships at the expense of genuine
problem solving that could be achieved on the basis of cross-cultural
understanding.
A realist, human rights approach to understanding international law
is today both the foundation for the most significant international legal
developments concerning indigenous peoples, like the decision of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Awas Tingni case, and the
most promising method for further forging such developments. With its
attention to power and authority from all relevant sources, combined
with its attention to the leading edge in the evolution of human rights
values, this approach is both pragmatic and ethical-a welcome
combination in the discourse of indigenous rights over lands and natural
resources.
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